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Why Do Local South Korean Market Leaders Supply Retailer Grocery 
Brands? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines why many of the leading South Korean brand manufacturers 
produce retailer brand products within their major product categories.  The reasons 
identified include: pressure from retailers; protection of other national brand product 
ranges; maintenance or improvements in working relationships; protection of other 
distribution channels; savings in marketing budgets; diversification of product lines 
and changing competitive structures.  Evidence is also provided of the dynamic nature 
of decision making relating to retail brand supply across the whole portfolio of brands 
which the manufacturer offers, rather than in respect of individual product brands or 
markets which has tended to be the focus of much existing work. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Retailer brand supply; response strategy; market leading brands; 
South Korea 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the main features of the South Korean retail market since it opened to 
foreign competition in 1996, has been the emergence and rapid growth of discount or 
hypermarket retail formats.  Additionally, according to Cho (2009), the entry of 
foreign retailers also stimulated interest in the development of retailer brand product 
ranges. Unlike in other countries, most of the leading national brand producers in 
South Korea have chosen to supply private brand products to the leading South 
Korean retailers. For example, LG which is the leader in the laundry detergent market 
and Pigeon which holds a similar position in the fabric conditioner market both 
provide retail brands to E-Mart. This is despite the potential negative impact upon 
their brand value arising from the legal requirement to disclose the manufacturers 
name on private brand packaging (Fugate, 1986). For branded manufacturers, the 
decision to supply a retailer private brand is likely to be considered as a strategic 
decision, primarily to either gain access to the retailer’s shelf-space and\or to maintain 
good relationships with the retail clients (Kaven and Call, 1967). 
Faced with the growth in private brands, Kaven and Call (1967) proposed that 
there were three general options for manufacturers: (1) become a retailer brand 
specialist, (2) become involved in supplying retailer brands in part, and (3) vigorously 
promote their own manufacturer brands, although the feasibility of these options 
varied by manufacturer. From in-store observations, it would appear that most local 
Korean market leaders have adopted the second strategy. Alongside their own 
manufacturer brand products, they have simultaneously cooperated to produce retailer 
private brands, despite the view of Quelch and Harding (1996) that market leading 
brands should enhance their own brand asset value, through various marketing 
activities, rather than supply retailer brand products.  
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 This paper aims to investigate why leading brand manufacturers in the South 
Korean market have become so involved in producing retailer brand products within 
their major product categories. The paper starts with a literature review focused on the 
response strategies of manufacturers to retailer brand growth, and then briefly 
explains the research methodology adopted. The next section analyzes the information 
gathered through in-depth interviews, in-store observations and company 
documentation. The final section concludes with some limitations of the current study 
and suggests future research directions. 
 
EXTERNAL FACTORS INFLUENCING THE RETAILER BRAND 
PRODUCTION DECISION 
Many authors have suggested how manufacturers might react to the growing 
market penetration of the retailer brand (e.g. Kaven and Call, 1967; Salmon and Cmar, 
1987; Glemet and Mira, 1993; Abe, 1995; Hoch, 1996; Quelch and Harding, 1996; 
Cullen and Whelan, 1997; Parker and Kim, 1997; Ashley, 1998; Dunne and 
Narasimhan, 1999; Mills, 1999; Verhoef et al., 2002; Karray and Zaccour, 2006; 
Timmor, 2007). In recent years, Gomez-Arias and Bello-Acebron (2008) identified 
why market leading manufacturers supply retailer brands, and Gomez and Benito 
(2008) examined which factors influenced manufacturers when they made the 
decision about retailer brand production.  
Often cited as one of the main external factors for the increasing market share 
of retailer brands, is the growing level of retail concentration in most markets (e.g. 
Laaksonen and Reynolds, 1994; Husson and Long, 1994; Nemoto, 1995; Steenkamp 
and Dekimpe, 1997; Tarzijan, 2004). It is believed that there is a clear relationship 
between retail concentration and buying power. The higher the level of retail 
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concentration and the stronger the retailer buying power is, the higher the market 
share of retailer brands.  
  As noted by many authors (e.g. Puelles, 1995; Quelch and Harding, 1996), the 
production of retailer brands allows manufacturers to take advantage of excess 
capacity. Therefore, changes in the economic climate could affect the manufacturers’ 
decision process. Manufacturers with excess capacity might choose to produce retailer 
brands to overcome recessionary pressures or in response to static markets. 
Furthermore, customers are likely to become more price-sensitive when faced with 
recession because of decreased discretionary income. Nandan and Dickinson (1994) 
found that the sales performance of generic retailer brand products was closely related 
to economic climate. It is also to be expected that in these types of markets, the 
marketing activities of leading manufacturer brands would also be under financial 
pressure. Hoch and Banerji (1993) claimed that national brands were likely to reduce 
their advertising budgets during recession. A decline in advertising spend tends to 
decrease consumer brand awareness, with consequences for brand choice and spend. 
Consequently tight economic conditions might encourage manufacturers to produce 
retailer brand products.   
  Compared to the UK and many other western markets, where retailers do not 
have to disclose the manufacturer’s name on retailer brand packaging, South Korean 
retailers have a legal obligation to do so (Cho, 2009). Although this law makes 
manufacturers uncomfortable - as consumers are able to see who makes the retail 
brand - unlike the global brand manufacturers such as P&G and Unilever, many of the 
South Korean national brand leaders have still chosen to produce retailer brand 
products. From the customer’s point of view, when choosing between a national brand 
and a retailer brand product made by the same manufacturer, the disclosure of the 
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manufacturers name on the packaging may also cause some confusion. If customers 
believe that there is no difference between a manufacturer brand and retailer brand 
product, they are more likely to choose the cheaper retailer brand. Consequently, the 
legal obligation in South Korea to reveal the product manufacturer could provide a 
barrier to supplying retailer brands.  
Unlike in the past, when customers perceived national brands as providing 
much better value in terms of product quality than retailer brands, customers have 
now become aware that retailer brands have moved much closer to manufacturer 
brand quality standards – and indeed in some markets, the retailers’ “premium brand” 
is often regarded as being of higher quality than the equivalent national brands (e.g. 
Landler, 1991; Nandan and Dickinson, 1994; Bhasin et al., 1995). The sophisticated 
product development and marketing skills employed in retailer branding, particularly 
in the approach to placement on the shelf of retail brand and carefully selected 
manufacturer brand, have allowed retailers to influence the customer’s perception of 
retailer private brands (Burt, 2000). As the marketing activities of retailers are likely 
to become more sophisticated and aggressive in the future, manufacturers may need to 
take steps to try to widen the customer’s perception gap between manufacturer and 
retailer brands, otherwise, the retailer brands will constantly cannibalize manufacturer 
brand markets. Perversely, however, some attempts by manufacturers to boost sales 
may be counter-productive in the long run. Declining national brand loyalty may be 
reinforced by some promotional activities, such as increased couponing, price 
reductions, and contests within stores (Giges, 1988; Nandan and Dickinson, 1994; 
Bhasin et al., 1995). As a consequence when considering retailer brand production, 
manufacturers should carefully consider the impact of any action upon changing 
customer perceptions of national brands.  
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RESPONSE STRATEGIES TO RETAILER BRAND GROWTH 
Hoch (1996) suggested that manufacturers have five options when faced with 
retail brand growth: (1) wait and do nothing, (2) increase distance from retailer brands, 
(3) reduce the price gap, (4) formulate a “me-too” strategy, and (5) make regular or 
premium retailer brands. Similarly, Mills (1999) stated that manufacturers could 
respond to retailers by: (1) increasing the quality gap, (2) introducing fighting brands, 
(3) adopting nonlinear pricing, (4) giving shelf payments and slotting allowances, and 
(5) issuing manufacturer coupons. These various options can be subsumed within 
three generic strategies which are: 
(1) do not produce retailer brands,  
(2) become partly involved in producing retailer brands, and finally  
(3) become a 100% retailer brand producer.  
It should, however be noted that most considerations in the literature refer to the early 
incarnations of retail brand development, so the applicability of these options to 
segmented retailer brand ranges including “premium” retailer brands may be 
questioned.  
In exploring the various responses it has to be remembered that the nature and 
the characteristics of the products themselves affect the type of response that is 
possible to execute. Temperature characteristics, shelf life, frequency of purchase and 
other characteristics all affect the choice of response. Similarly most manufacturers 
offer several brands and manage a portfolio of brands, often across several product 
categories, in order to compete with retailer and other manufacturer brands.  The scale 
and scope of these portfolios will also influence the nature of their response to retail 
brand growth. 
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Option One: Do not produce retailer brands 
If manufacturers choose not to produce retailer brands they are faced with a 
number of options. 
 
Pursuing an advertising enhancement strategy 
Advertising is one of the most important marketing tools used to build brands 
through improving perceptions of quality, communicating brand associations and 
establishing customer brand loyalty (Achenbaum, 1989; Lindsay, 1990; Simon and 
Sullivan, 1993). Several authors have suggested an advertising enhancement strategy 
as a way to defend against the threat of retailer brands (e.g. Hoch and Banerji, 1993; 
Abe, 1995; Hoch, 1996; Parker and Kim, 1997; Ashley, 1998; Karray and Zaccour, 
2006). Verhoef et al. (2002) demonstrated that manufacturers in the Netherlands used 
advertising to increase the distance between their brands and retailer brands. 
Moreover, Ashley (1998) studied the relationship between manufacturer’s advertising 
and retailer brand market share, and found that sales-effective and persuasive 
advertising was the most effective way to differentiate themselves from competitors 
and to compete profitably with retailer brands. Other authors (e.g. Comanor and 
Wilson, 1979; Boulding et al., 1994) also suggest that companies might be able to use  
advertising to create distance from competitors, thereby avoiding direct competition  
whilst Parker and Kim (1997) argued that advertising can increase a company’s profit 
by creating differentiation.  
However, most authors tend to overlook the ability of manufacturers to 
increase advertising spend. Even though every manufacturer wants to advertise their 
brands and products in a variety of media, the cost can be prohibitive. For example in 
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Cullen and Whelan’s finding (1997) market dominant manufacturers advertised 
heavily with frequent new product line introductions, whilst trapped manufacturers 
spent their marketing expenditure on promoting their existing products. From a 
different perspective, de Chernatony (1989) argued that a reduction in advertising 
spend tends to make customers perceive national manufacturer brands as similar to 
retailer brands. In other words, advertising is needed to differentiate manufacturer 
brands from retailer brands. 
 
Increasing the distance from retailer brands 
There are many different ways - such as packaging improvement, container 
development, and quality improvement - to increase the distance (real or perceived) 
between manufacturer and retailer brands (Hoch, 1996). Quality is one of the most 
important considerations when consumers make buying decisions. When purchasing 
retailer brand products, the quality factor has a significant impact on purchasing 
behaviour (Sethuraman, 1992; Hoch and Banerji, 1993; Dawar and Parker, 1994; 
Dick et al., 1995; Batra and Sinha, 2000). Furthermore, Dick et al. (1995) stated that 
consumers who are less likely to purchase retailer brands consider retailer brands to 
be lower quality products than national brands. Consistent with this argument, Hoch 
(1996) found that the success of retailer brands depends on their quality. In an effort 
to win customers from national brands, improvements have been made in the product 
quality of retailer brands (Steenkamp and Dekimpe, 1997). Thus, many authors 
encourage manufacturers to develop innovative product quality to differentiate 
themselves from retailer brands (e.g. Hoch, 1996; Dunne and Narasimhan, 1999; 
Verhoef et al., 2002).   
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This option requires manufacturers to allocate more resources to the research 
and development of new innovative products than to other options. Furthermore, this 
strategy is closely related to the development of premium retailer brands by retailers.  
Retailers also realized that innovative product quality improvement is a key factor to 
growing market share. The focus on improving quality and reducing the perceived 
quality gap with manufacturer brands has seen retailers improve their procurement 
processes relating to retailer brands and make considerable efforts to monitor and 
control retailer brand product quality (Quelch and Harding, 1996).  
 
Introduce fighting brands 
To maintain the market position of existing national brands, it has been 
suggested that manufacturers can counter retail brands by launching fighting brands 
(Hoch, 1996; Quelch and Harding, 1996; Dunne and Narasimhan, 1999; Mills, 1999).  
As pointed out by Hoch (1996), the introduction of fighting brands closes the price 
gap to the price-oriented retailer brands rather than seeking differentiation from them. 
The main objective of this option, is to avoid direct price competition by creating a 
different product. Without this approach, current national brands may be faced with 
pressure to make regular price cuts to compete with retailer brands. Theoretically, the 
introduction of a fighting brand allows manufacturers to avoid this situation The 
production of a me-too product similar to retailer brands, that is, a flanker brand 
enables manufacturers to maximize any excess manufacturing capacity without 
resorting to retailer brand production (Hoch, 1996). Finally, this option can counter 
the market share of retailer brands, by preventing the profit erosion of national brands 
(Quelch and Harding, 1996). 
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Even though a flanker brand provides a variety of advantages to manufacturers, 
it is not without risk. When manufacturers pursue this strategy, the production- and 
marketing-related issues relating to the flanker brand should be fully considered. As 
noted by Hoch (1996), the fighting brand could actually erode the premium national 
brand market share, rather than competing with retailer brands. In terms of time and 
cost, this brand also requires the same management time and costs as a premium 
brand such as considerations of a market entry fee, advertising budget, slotting 
allowances etc. As a result, the fighter brand may become an unprofitable trouble 
maker.   
From the retailer’s perspective, retailers may not be in favour of fighting 
brands, as they could be considered as an alternative to their retailer brands. 
Accordingly, the fighter brand might be dealt unfavourably by retailers. Retailers may 
avoid allocating shelf space to fighting brands or may not allocate enough shelf space, 
because they favour their own retailer brands.  
 
Reduce the price gap 
Manufacturers can adopt this response relatively easily to compete with first to 
third generation retailer brands as defined by Laaksonen and Reynolds (1994). Hoch 
(1996) found that the price gap between national brands and retailer brands 
significantly influenced the sales volume and profitability of both brands, although 
Hoch and Banerji (1993) argued that the price gap was not related to retailer brand 
market share. A small price gap allowed national brands to increase their sales, 
whereas a large gap favoured retailer brand sales. Sethuraman (1992), Dhar and Hoch 
(1997), and Ashley (1998) suggest that a significant price gap between leading 
national brands and retailer brands positively affects retailer brand market share. 
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However, a significant price reduction for national brand products leads to a 
lower profit contribution (Quelch and Harding, 1996; Verhoef et al., 2002), and this 
option might also have a negative impact on customer perceptions of the national 
brand by decreasing national brand value and bringing leading national brands into 
direct price competition. Moreover, this option might harm the business relationship 
between manufacturers and retailers, because it directly attacks retailer brands.  
This approach is adopted differently depending on the market position or 
power of manufacturers. According to Cullen and Whelan (1997), dominant national 
brands are prone to a premium price policy, rather than reducing regular prices, while 
trapped brands are more likely to cut prices. This option is more applicable to the 
second or lower-ranked brands of manufacturers in the marketplace, as these brands 
are sensitive to price competition. In contrast, leading brands are less sensitive to the 
price gap (Hoch, 1996). This means that although market leading manufacturers may 
cut their product prices, there might be no big change in retailer brand performance. 
Not all national brands, however, enjoy such a premium (Cho, 2009).      
      
Develop other promotional techniques 
Other options to attract new customers and keep current customers, include 
different promotional techniques, such as coupons, in-store contests, specific events, 
and so on, which avoid direct price competition with retailers. These options are 
time-limited.  Mills (1999) suggested that manufacturers under threat from retailer 
brands had to develop new innovative promotional techniques to keep their current 
market power. One example is the issuing of different types of coupons, for example 
discount coupon or a bonus coupon to be redeemed by customers who are more 
likely to purchase retailer brands (Quelch and Harding, 1996; Mills, 1999). These 
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coupons avoid direct price competition, and are less harmful to brand reputation in 
the short term. From the retailer’s point of view, these options create costs as they 
have to establish redemption centres for customers visiting stores with coupons.   
If manufacturers hold in-store contests and other promotions for example 
using brand promoters in-store, the exposure rate of their brands to customers within 
the stores can increase. Manufacturers need to co-operate with retailers to participate 
in such activities. Compared to coupon issues, retailers might be in favour of in-store 
promotions that excite shoppers and add to the shopping experience.  In terms of the 
shopping atmosphere, this might be preferred by retailers, as total sales can rise.   
 
Wait and do nothing 
This is the highest risk option. Verhoef et al. (2002) found that those 
companies which did not adopt a specific response strategy achieved the worst 
performance. Hoch (1996) argued that because the retailer brand market was volatile 
and retailer brand production sometimes required manufacturers to invest large sums 
of money in production processes, manufacturers should not to make quick decisions 
on how to react.  Given the time and US context within which Hoch was writing it 
might have been difficult for him to envisage the way retailer brand programs have 
since developed. 
For manufacturers with weaker market positions, the “do nothing” option 
might increase the risk of being delisted, as retailers allocate more selling space to 
their retailer brands (Suarez, 2005). 
 
Provide additional allowances 
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This option is driven by the need to keep good working relationships and to 
strengthen existing ties with retailers. Kelly (1991) and Sullivan (1997) argued that 
retailers use shelf allowances as an efficient criterion to allocate scarce shelf space to 
manufacturers. There are a wide variety of allowance in the marketplace, such as shelf 
allowances, end-cap fees, advertising fees, promotion fees, discounts without selling 
price cuts, incentives when sales targets agreed by suppliers are achieved, special 
display fees, and even disposal costs for dead stock, return costs and the like. 
Currently, retailers officially impose these allowances within contract conditions, 
subject to rules and regulations derived from legislation to govern retailer-supplier 
relationships.   
By providing these allowances for retailers, manufacturers can discourage 
retailers from promoting their retailer brand programs according to the profit structure 
of individual product categories. However, this option requires a significant marketing 
budget from the manufacturer’s perspective. Moreover, how much manufacturers 
have to pay in allowances is a complicated issue, and is dependent upon negotiation 
skills. In the same vein, Mills (1999) argued that shelf fees and slotting allowances are 
not a good way to compete with retailer brands.  
 
Differentiate packaging design, product size or product containers 
Differentiated product sizes may discourage consumers from directly 
comparing prices in one retailer’s store with those in another retailers’ store. This 
approach emerged because of price competition amongst retailers using the same 
brand products with the same product size and the same packaging design. 
Manufacturers can apply this option as a differentiation strategy. Given that 
retailers are more likely to imitate the size, product container and even packaging 
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design of national brand products (Cho, 2009), some differentiation in these elements 
might allow the national brand to differentiate itself from retailer brands. Although 
this can be seen as part of the effort to increase the perceptual distance from retailer 
brands, it is a different form of differentiation, and compared to the quality 
improvement strategy, might be a relatively efficient way in terms of cost. However, 
changing product packaging and design, requires investment in marketing budgets to 
in make customers aware of the new product packages.  
 
Open up a new market 
One final option for some manufacturers may be to escape from the market 
where retailer brands take control and to enter into less competitive markets, where 
national brands are stronger than retailer brands at regional or national market levels. 
For the manufacturer trapped between the national brand and retailer brands, rather 
than producing retailer brands, expansion into other markets may be a good strategy. 
This brief review highlighted several options open to manufacturers who do 
not wish to produce retailer brands.  When selecting between these options, the 
financial investment required, the management time (and costs) needed, and the 
manufacturers’ market position, brand and product portfolio, relationship with 
retailers and the long term suitability of each strategy should be considered.   
Additionally, as retailer brand programmes themselves evolve over time, for example 
with the introduction of premium and segmented retailer brands, the benefits and risks 
of some of these options might change. 
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Option Two: Become partially involved in producing retailer brands 
Some manufacturers produce retailer brands whilst supplying their 
manufacturer brand products to retailers at the same time. In case of the first to third 
generation of retailer brands, whilst the market leading brands might not want to 
supply these products, other lower-ranked manufacturers might be happy to do so.  
Hoch (1996) recommended that national brands should only participate in retailer 
brand production in the case of premium retailer brands.   
It is easier for market leaders to opt for this strategy, compared to trapped 
manufacturers, because retailers know about their quality management skills, and 
often want them to produce retailer brands. According to Hoch (1996), 30% of the 
national brand manufacturers he examined were willing to produce retailer brands. At 
that time, they did not want to supply retailer brands in their leading product 
categories, but rather in secondary product categories where they did not have their 
own national brands. For example, Kraft produced retailer brand cooking vegetable 
oil and 3M supplied film. When national brand manufacturers did supply retailer 
brands to retailers in their main product categories, these were mainly in commodity 
categories.  
With respect to the motives for producing retailer brands, there are many 
different arguments, depending on the type of retailer brands being produced by the 
manufacturer. The objectives of the market leading brands participating in the supply 
of premium retail brands are different from those of manufacturers supplying other 
types of retailer brands. When manufacturers supply traditional price-oriented retailer 
brands, they often have to make large economic sacrifices under retailer pressure. 
However, as noted by Dunne and Narasimhan (1999), in the case of premium brand 
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production, manufacturers can take relatively higher margins than when producing 
traditional retailer brands.  
One of the most important advantages of adopting this strategy is to develop 
and cultivate more favourable trading relationships with retailers (e.g. Mangold and 
Faulds, 1993; Nogales and Suarez, 2005), as seen in Figure 1.  
 
Option Three: Become a 100% retailer brand producer 
This option might be suitable for those manufacturers with both weak brand 
power and limited marketing budgets.  These manufacturers are most likely to see 
their products delisted, as retailers introduce retailer brands into a product category, 
therefore they may prefer this option in order to remain in the market with reduced 
marketing costs.  
 
FIGURE 1.  Advantages and Disadvantages of Retailer Brand Production  
 
Group Characteristics 
Advantages 
 
 improvement of efficiency of factory operation  
 spreads fixed costs over higher levels of production 
 refusal may allow a competitor to enter 
 potential stepping-stone to business expansion 
 reduces entry costs for smaller producers 
 allows brand leaders to control shelf space, market control and 
profits 
 maintains a good working relationship with the retailer 
 discourages newcomers from entering the market 
 retailers and manufacturers pursue mutual benefits rather than 
compete 
 easier acquisition of consumer information 
 guarantee of a market access 
 provides a stable profit source if the contract continues, based on 
profit guarantees 
 
18 
Disadvantages 
 
 profit from production may be short-term 
 subordination to retailer control may increase 
 simultaneous management of own brand  and retailer brands will 
be complicated 
 retailer brands may cannibalize existing brand share 
 corporate image will be damaged 
 additional investment may be needed  
 retailers may pay more attention to the retailer brand rather than 
the manufacturer brand 
 if retailers find producers offering better trading terms, the 
contact may cease and technology and expertise may be 
transferred 
 margins are lower  
 bargaining power for raw materials is lost if retailers change 
supplier 
 rebuilding cost of manufacturer brand will be needed, if 
promotion or advertising has been reduced 
   
    
Source: Adapted from Euromonitor (1986, 1996); Mangold and Faulds (1993); Glemet  
and Mira (1993); Samways (1995); Hoch (1996); Quelch and Harding (1996);  
de Chernatony and McWilliam (1988); Mintel (1998); Kim and Parker (1999); 
Dunne and Narasimhan (1999); McGoldrick (2002); Nogales and Suarez 
(2005) 
 
This strategy, it is not without risk. Retailers may seek out alternative 
manufacturers offering lower production costs and\or improved profit margins. If 
retailers find an alternative manufacturer, the contact will be terminated. Retailer 
brand manufacturers have, therefore, to keep a close eye on retailers’ requirements, 
maintain a good working relationship with their retail clients and be willing to 
respond to and create ideas for new product development.  
 
AIM AND METHODOLOGY 
 Despite the various options open to manufacturers to help them avoid 
producing retail brands, many market leaders in South Korea supply retailer brands in 
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their main product categories.  This research sought to investigate why these 
companies decided to supply retailer brands.   
A sample of seven national brand manufacturers, covering both the food and 
non-food sectors, (Figure 2) was chosen to provide cases which would allow the 
researcher to capture the decision-making processes and identify the context within 
which the decision to supply retailer brands was made (Kidder, 1982; Eisenhardt, 
1989; and Yin, 1994). The selection of firms avoided situations where there is some 
form of ownership relationship between supplier and retailer. Food and non-food 
product categories were selected that have a substantial volume of sales and do no 
have a strong seasonal pattern of sales. These firms provided 16 retailer brands across 
the product categories investigated, for three leading South Korean retailers. Owing to 
the sales volume and the extent to which the case companies influence the South 
Korean consumer market, it was felt that these case companies provided a suitable 
sample frame for the research.  For each company material was collected through in-
depth interviews, store observations and company documentation.  The in-depth 
interviews were conducted in seven firms with senior mangers who were responsible 
for the retailer brand production decision.   
 
FIGURE 2.  Manufacturer’s Supplying Retailer Brands: Case Companies 
Category Manufacturer Retailer Retail Brand name 
Food 
Confectionary  Lotte 
Tesco Korea Joun 
E-Mart E-Mart 
Cheese  Seoul 
E-Mart E-Mart 
Lotte Mart Wiselect  
Smoked ham Daesang E-Mart Save 
Soy sauce Daesang E-Mart E-Mart 
Cooking oil SajoHaePyo E-Mart E-Mart 
Mayonnaise  Daesang Tesco Korea Joun 
Ketchup Daesang Tesco Korea Joun 
Non- Laundry detergent  LG E-Mart E-Mart 
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food Fabric conditioner  Pigeon E-Mart E-Mart 
Soap LG E-Mart  E-Mart best 
Toothbrush LG E-Mart E-Mart 
Detergent  Yuhan E-Mart E-Mart 
Toothpaste LG E-Mart E-Mart 
Nappies  LG Lotte Mart Wiselect  
 
 
 
 FINDINGS 
From the case studies, seven distinct motives for supplying retailer brands 
were identified:  
 
Pressure from retailers 
 The respondents claimed that E-Mart put considerable pressure on them to 
produce retailer brands. It was said that the increased market share and buying power 
of E-Mart allowed the retailer brand buyers to pressure the existing market leaders to 
become involved in E-Mart’s retailer brand programme. This pressure had increased 
following the success of Tesco Korea and their retailer brand programme. The 
respondents commented that E-Mart used its position to improve the reputation of the 
E-Mart retail brands by informing consumers that its retailer brands were produced by 
the leading manufacturers. A commonly expressed view was: 
“If we don’t supply E-Mart brands, that is, follow E-Mart’s requirement, E-
Mart will abuse its buying power to delist our second tier or other lower-
ranked products. What’s important is that E-Mart will be more favourable to 
our competitors than ever before. Accordingly, we cannot help but follow E-
Mart’s proposal.” (LG) 
 Most respondents regarded their E-Mart account as one of their most 
important. One respondent emphasized that the decision to supply retailer brand was 
one of the most difficult decisions that the company has made. Within the case 
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companies, the retailer brand supply decision was typically made after considerable 
debate between the sales and marketing divisions. The core issue was how to deal 
with the pressure from E-Mart and the other major retailers, not simply in respect of 
the single product category under consideration, but with the overall business 
relationship with E-Mart in mind: 
“When discussing retailer brand supply, our interest is to overcome the 
pressure from the buying power of E-Mart. If we refused to supply E-Mart 
brand products, E-Mart would reduce the number of our product facings on 
their shelves and further, increase the shelf allocation of, and/or promote, 
second or third tier brands on purpose. Furthermore, E-Mart will not accept 
new products. Of course, the retailer will delist our second or third ranked 
products from their shelves. This is one of the most complicated issues for the 
market leaders” (Yuhan) 
 Pressure from E-Mart and the other large retailers was regarded as the most 
important driver in explaining why many South Korean market leaders also produced 
retailer brands. The market leaders were typically offered favourable trading terms 
from E-Mart, like better shelf allocation for their national brands or the delisting of 
competitors’ products, alongside the proposal to produce retailer brands. From the 
manufacturers’ perspective, this trading pressure was a big challenge to maintaining 
their market positions in Korea. As E-Mart and Tesco Korea have taken more buying 
power, this pressure has been accepted by the leading national brands. Nonetheless, 
despite the negative (reactive) undertones, the researcher felt that the respondents 
were generally satisfied with their decision to supply retailer brands. Although the 
manufacturers marketing divisions typically highlighted potential side-effects from 
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producing retailer brands, these potential problems had not materialised at the time of 
the interview: 
“Considering the Korean business environment, when E-Mart requires 
manufacturers to produce E-Mart brands, it is difficult to reject” (Seoul) 
This comment emphasises the awareness of the manufacturer of the highly dynamic 
nature of relationships involving the production of retail brand products. 
 
Protect other national brand product ranges 
The case companies produced or supplied retailer brands in many different 
product categories.  For example, LG supplied products to E-Mart in more than 
twenty categories including laundry detergents, washing-up liquids, and toothpaste - 
categories in which LG is the market leader. Laundry detergent and toothpaste are 
regarded as the main product groups within the portfolio of brands manufactured by 
the company. Despite this, LG still decided to supply E-Mart brands:  
“We have produced many different product categories. All categories are not 
the market leaders. We have to think about the whole business. Even though in 
some categories we have led the Korean market, and their (retail brand) 
positions within the company are smaller than other total categories in terms 
of sales volume, we have to accept the suggestion of E-Mart to protect other 
product categories on the shelves. If we refused E-Mart’s proposal, our total 
market volume would be reduced. As you know, we know that we have to 
advertise our own products more and allocate more marketing resources to 
leading brand products to keep and stabilize our leading brand markets” (LG) 
The LG products provided for E-Mart as retailer brands account for less than 
1 % of LG’s total sales volume. At the expense of the major product categories, LG 
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sought to protect other (weaker) product categories and generate more sales overall. 
Consequently, retailer brand supply brought LG more benefits, as highlighted by 
Verhoef et al. (2002). Most suppliers agreed with this view. Furthermore, respondents 
believed that this sacrifice - supplying retailer brands in the major product categories - 
encouraged E-Mart to aggressively promote manufacturer brand products, such as 
second tier brands, in their stores as a way to compensate the suppliers for their losses. 
Rather than losing their leading brand positions in the market, the retailer brand 
suppliers felt that they often enjoyed additional benefits, as the retailer brands were 
usually displayed in the best shelf positions and given favourable distribution (e.g. 
Weinstein, 1993; Corstjens et al., 1994; Hoch, 1996). Associated with this argument, 
one respondent pointed out that most retailer brand suppliers have not experienced the 
problems anticipated by their marketing divisions. It was felt by the respondents that 
this trend would continue and be accepted by the other market leading manufacturer 
brands, who have not yet produced retailer brands. In summary, the strategic sacrifice 
of the leading brands in their main product categories was accepted if it maintained 
the market position of their second or lower-ranked brands in other product categories.   
But, there is awareness of the danger that a retailer gives favourable terms initially to 
encourage the involvement of the manufacturer only for these terms to be tightened 
when the supply contract is renegotiated. 
 
Maintenance or improvements in working relationships 
The decision by Pigeon to supply E-Mart illustrates this point. This company 
started to produce retailer brand products in 2002 even though the company accounted 
for more than 70 % of the fabric conditioner market at the time. A senior manger 
explained the rationale for this move: 
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“It was a shock that the top management decided to produce E-Mart brands in 
2002. There was no strong pressure from E-Mart, although E-Mart suggested 
retailer brand supply. At that time, our working relationship with E-Mart was 
fantastic. Particularly, the CEO has kept the best trading relationship with the 
top managements of E-Mart. That is why Pigeon could not refuse E-Mart’s 
proposal” (Pigeon) 
The literature suggests that retailer brand supply provides a clear opportunity 
for second or third tier manufacturers to maintain good relationships with retailers 
(e.g. Mangold and Faulds, 1993; Hoch, 1996; Dunne and Narasimhan, 1999; Verhoef 
et al., 2002; Nogales and Suarez, 2005).  However, Pigeon became the first market 
leader to produce E-Mart brand products. This was a breathtaking decision from a 
marketing point of view and acted as a catalyst in encouraging other leading brand 
manufacturers to join the supplier group for E-Mart retailer brands. Following this 
move, a few other leading brands like Haitai, Crown and Seoul, started to supply 
retail brands to E-Mart.  
 The sales performance of E-Mart retailer brands is reported as being lower 
than expected for most of the suppliers in the study. For example, Pigeon’s E-Mart 
brand products account for less than 5% of Pigeon’s total fabric conditioner sales, 
although in some categories exceed 10% of category sales.. However, since Pigeon 
started to supply E-Mart brand products, the company size has trebled. Given this 
rapid growth, Pigeon has consistently maintained good trading relationships with E-
Mart. Consequently, many of the local South Korean market leaders have turned their 
attention to retailer brand supply in order to keep good trading relationships and to 
expand their business overall.   
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 The decision of the market leaders to supply retailer brands should have a 
negative impact upon other manufacturers attempting to enter the retailer brand 
supply market. Some of the case companies have supplied different retailer brands to 
different retailers.  The leading manufacturers who carry second tier brands in some 
product categories have also experienced competition from retailer brand supply. The 
motive of maintaining or improving supplier relationships is more likely to be widely 
accepted by manufacturers, including lower-ranked producers. Most respondents 
argued that for the market leaders, the major constraint was in persuading the 
marketing staff within their own company: 
“Marketing staff can not understand the real business environment. They tend 
to stick to their bias in which leading brands have to increase brand 
awareness through advertising spending. Rather than advertising, keeping a 
good relationship with retailers is the most important business activity. If not, 
we will be delisted from the shelves” (Yuhan) 
Maintaining good working relationships with large retailers in this way has 
implications for the market prices charged in other channels in the Korean market. If 
the major retailers reduce prices in their stores, this could cause major difficulties for 
the leading brand manufacturers in other channels. Maintaining a good working 
relationship with retailers through the supply of retailer brands contributes to the 
management of other channels:  
“In order to keep market prices in Korea, the role of major retailers is very 
important. Suddenly, if they cut selling prices to tame national brands, 
because of bad relationship, the national manufacturers will definitely get into 
a panic. So, supplying retailer brands allows us to keep a good working 
relationship with retailers” (LG) 
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  Protection of other distribution channels 
Many authors have argued that the supply of retailer brands could cause long 
term damage as they may cannibalise the sales of national brand products, and 
damage relationships with other retailers. However, since Pigeon started to produce 
E-Mart brands in 2002, and were followed by Daesang in 2001, Yuhan in 2004, LG in 
2005, and Seoul in 2007, there has been no major long-term conflict between these 
suppliers and their other retail customers. A few respondents commented on this 
theme: 
“The production of retailer brands was one of the most difficult decisions. 
Many staff worried about its side-effects. The marketing division was strongly 
against it. Their arguments focused on the company’s future. However, the 
debate within the company is pointless, because the whole sales performance 
has become better and better” (Daesang)  
In contrast to previous research the South Korean market brand leaders appear 
to have benefited from supplying retailer brands. The companies interviewed 
commonly stated that supplying retailer brands to a major retailer is now widely 
accepted by other marketing channels. This is why many leading national brands are 
now involved in retailer brand production. However, there were some trading 
conflicts at least initially. As pointed out by a few respondents, Tesco Korea and Lotte 
Mart reacted unfavourably to those market leaders who supplied E-Mart brands. 
However, this conflict was solved by changing the trading terms, such as also 
providing retailer brands for them, better discounts, allowances and the like. In 
addition, because so many national brands started to supply E-Mart, the tension in the 
marketplace was reduced:  
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“Indeed, the second and third retailers changed their attitude towards us after 
they knew it. They used to threaten us with the deletion of less-known products. 
Over time, however, they started to give up pressure on us, because of the 
increasing number of market leaders supplying E-Mart brands” (Yuhan)  
 In contrast to the findings of Gomez and Benito (2008) that manufacturers 
tended to avoid producing retailer brands, because of the cannibalization of national 
brand sales, most of the suppliers interviewed stated that there was no difference in 
terms of market share after the decision to supply.  They commented that the E-Mart 
brands absorbed those customers who bought second or third tier brands, and as 
national brand prices would sometimes be lower than retailer brand prices, there had 
been no cannibalisation of sales.   The overall sales performance of the market leaders 
supplying E-Mart brands, had improved throughout all marketing channels, rather 
than hurting the company’s profit structure.      
 
Savings in marketing budgets 
Several researchers have highlighted that one of the advantages for 
manufacturers in supplying retailer brands is the reduction in the overall marketing 
and development costs of retailer brands (Bell et al., 1997).  Some of the respondents 
also mentioned that as a consequence of supplying retail brands they gained 
marketing-related information from the retailers, consistent with the Dunne and 
Narasimhan’s findings (1999). This information allowed the market leaders to gain 
access to real-time market information without the need to spend on market research 
and helped to shorten the time needed for new product development. In other words, 
the supply of retailer brands can save marketing costs for both retailer and 
manufacturer brand products.  
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The market leaders operate dedicated marketing teams focussed on marketing 
their own products. Before supplying retailer brands they needed to allocate 
substantial resources to activities such as market research, advertising, sample tests, 
etc. to every new product launch:   
“There is no additional cost when supplying E-Mart brands, except for the 
changing cost of packaging, in terms of the product development process. Of 
course, we have to supply them at a lower production cost than our national 
brands. Given the pure costs of retailer brands, it was cheaper” (Pigeon) 
To supply retailer brand products, the leading brand manufacturers did not 
need to establish a new production line or increase their marketing budget. Whilst 
these resources are needed for national brands, as many retailer brands are regarded as  
copies of national brands they provide the opportunity to recycle the know-how or 
production capacity of existing national brands. Consequently the marketing costs for 
retailer brands are significantly reduced. When debating whether to produce retailer 
brands these financial aspects were often used to support the case: 
“Marketing staff changed their attitude towards retailer brand supply. 
Although they still worry about it, they think its advantages outweigh the 
disadvantages. The supply of retailer brands helped to save marketing budget 
over the whole product development process” (LG) 
 
Diversifying product lines  
 It was clear from the interviews and other documentation that the sales volume 
of the product categories in which the leading national brands supplied retailer brands, 
had not grown to dominate the companies business.  The case companies each 
accounted for between 40-75 % of sales within the major categories in which they 
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operated. For example, in case of bleach, Yuhan (who supplies E-Mart brands) had a 
75% share of the bleach market, but this product category only accounted for a third 
of the company’s total sales volume. Pigeon exhibits a similar picture in the fabric 
conditioner market.  
 The local South Korean market leaders have diversified their business 
portfolios. Rather than focusing on specific product categories, they have allocated 
their marketing assets into diverse product categories. Amongst the companies 
interviewed, there was no case in which a single product category accounts for more 
than a third of the company’s total sales volume. This spread of activity across the 
business allows the Korean market leaders to join the retailer brand supply market. 
 One of the most common reasons given by the respondents for deciding to 
supply retail brands was to grow other product categories in market. Unless the 
companies could expand their business into foreign markets within their key product 
categories, their business potential might peak in South Korea. Consequently, the 
market leaders turned their attention to other product categories through their good 
working relationships with retailers arising from the supply of retailer brands. An 
example is the success of Pigeon in the liquid laundry detergent market. Pigeon stated 
that they could not have entered into this new product category without the help of E-
Mart in developing and promoting this new product.  Retailer brand production was 
considered to be a useful lever between the national brand manufacturers and retailers. 
Some respondents argued that, rather than debating within the company whether to 
produce retailer brands, the company should think about how to grow and make their 
business profitable through retailer brand production – retail brand production is an 
opportunity not just a threat. The global manufacturers (e.g. P&G and Unilever) have 
refused to supply retailer brands in South Korea and have lost market.  The supply of 
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retailer brands is felt to be a reason why the sales volumes of local suppliers have 
grown:   
“Korean market leaders are in favour of supplying retailer brands. However, 
foreign manufacturers don’t want it, because of global standardization. If they 
do not change their market strategy in Korea, the declining trend of their sales 
performance might be continued. Look at local national brands! Supplying 
retailer brands, they’ve dramatically increased their sales volume. Over the 
last decade, they grew at least 2 times or 4 times. It’s unbelievable” (LG) 
The market leaders distribute across a wide range of product categories. As a 
result, their dependence on retailer brands is lower than might be expected.  
 
Changing competitive structure – excluding competitors 
 As the number of national brand manufacturers supplying retailer brands 
increases, the competitive structure of the South Korean market becomes tighter than 
ever before. The supply of retailer brands has become a preferred way to maintain 
existing market share.  Through better working relationships with the major retailers, 
the market leaders can compete with each other to gain market share in both their 
main and other product categories. Companies have exhibited a positive attitude 
toward retailer brand supply in recent years – notably the second or third tier brand 
manufacturers who competed to provide retailer brands in the past:     
“Recently, it’s very difficult to keep our market share. Retailers wield their 
strong market power to change market structure. Over competitive product 
categories, keeping market shares is more likely to depend on whether to 
supply retailer brands. If we don’t supply them, the major retailer would 
encourage our competitors to produce retailer brand products, suggesting 
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better trading terms. Finally, we would go out of the retailer’s shelves, even 
though enhancing product ads. As for competitive categories, this trend will 
be continued, because of competitors. As evidence, global brands are 
declining, because they don’t supply retailer brands.” (Yuhan)   
The changing channel means that the future competitive structure of the 
market is most likely to be developed by the retailers. Unlike in the past when all that 
the manufacturers had to do was to beat the competition through their own marketing 
efforts, the retailers now influence the nature of competition amongst manufacturers. 
The degree to which the major retailers have put pressure on the market leaders to 
supply retailer brands is directly related to this changing competitive structure, as 
noted in the quote above. Changing competitive circumstances have forced the market 
leaders to produce retailer brands in the major product categories. Given this, it is 
natural that the global manufacturers who do not supply retailer brands in Korea have 
faced difficulties. The respondents felt that with the increasing market power of 
retailers, this trend would continue.   
 
Concerns about the supply of retailer brands 
 Despite these pressures and motivations one might also consider whether 
producing retailer brands is a good strategy in the long term from the national brand 
manufacturer’s point of view. Given the legal requirement in South Korea that the 
manufacturer’s name should be declared on the retailer brand package, national brand 
value could be damaged and the national market leaders might lose their market 
power and market share in the long term. It is evident that the global manufacturer 
brands do not produce retailer brands in the South Korean market.  
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 Although their decision to produce retail brand may deliver advantages at 
present, some interviewees recognised that this strategy could increase the degree of 
dependence on the retail giants and could even cannibalise the sales of their main 
branded product categories. As noted by one of interviewees, as retailer brand market 
share increases, long-term profit might fall, because of lower customer brand loyalty 
to their national brands: 
“In the current retail environment, supplying retailer brands is the best option 
to survive in Korea, although this decision might negatively affect our future 
profit in the long term. I know the customers who know that our company 
produces retailer brands might become less loyal to our brands” (Pigeon) 
  Despite recognition of the potential long term erosion of loyalty most 
national brand market leaders accepted this, as the focus was on increasing volume to 
contribute to company growth. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 This research investigated why the local South Korean leading brand 
manufacturers decided to supply retailer brands to major retailers. Within the existing 
literature there is a strong focus on why and how manufacturers should avoid 
supplying retailer brands, although much of this academic material comes from a 
specific cultural and time context.  In the South Korean market there is a further 
potential disincentive to retailer brand production, namely the legal requirement to 
reveal the manufacturer’s name on the product. 
Despite these existing views, the majority of the leading South Korean 
national brand manufacturers have elected to manufacture retailer brands alongside 
their national brands. They claim that this approach provides more benefits than 
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drawbacks. Rather than competing with retailer brands produced by second or third 
tier manufacturers, retailer brand supply was regarded as the best way to maintain or 
increase their market share.  This supports the views of Chen et al. (2010), who 
claimed that national brand manufacturers can benefit from supplying retailer brands. 
 With respect to motives, at the early stage of participation in retailer brand 
supply it was apparent that the pressure from E-Mart was one of the most important 
reasons for supplying these products. Nevertheless, even though the national brand 
manufacturers started to supply E-Mart brands because of this pressure, most soon 
realized that retailer brand production protected other (non-major) product categories, 
through improved relationships with retailers; led to little conflict between the major 
retailers and other channels; and provided savings in marketing budgets. These 
advantages imply that, rather than regarding the supply of retail brands as a reactive, 
defensive, strategy, retailer brand production should be considered as a positive 
option for the national leading brands in Korea.  
 The findings also suggest that manufacturers look beyond the specific issues 
associated with individual retail brand products being produced, in order to see retail 
brand production as part of the wider scope of management of the total brand 
portfolio. This is a perspective that is seldom addressed in the academic literature but 
exhibits the complexity of brand management and a more holistic view of retail brand 
production than is evident from previous studies. The research also shows that 
manufacturers view the production of retail brands, and the implication for their own 
manufacturer brands, as an extremely dynamic process that changes as the structure of 
the industry changes and as concepts of brand use by retailers evolves. These findings 
suggest that future research needs to explore the dynamics of  the inter-relationships 
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involving both retailer and manufacturer brand production not only at the product 
level but also in terms of the brand portfolios of manufacturers and retailers. 
Most of the previous research into the motives for manufacturers to provide 
retail brands has been conducted in Europe and North America.  This research 
explores these issues in an East Asian context.  That said, the South Korean retail and 
supply market structures may illustrate a specific feature within East Asia, in that 
national brand leaders have actively pursued a strategy of providing retailer brands for 
retailers, even within their key product categories. This feature should be borne in 
mind before generalizing these findings to other Asian countries.  
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